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Abstract. In this paper, we consider the Hospital Residents problem (HR) and the
Hospital Residents problem with Lower Quotas (HRLQ). In this model with two sided
preferences, stability is a well accepted notion of optimality. However, in the pres-
ence of lower quotas, a stable and feasible matching need not exist. For the HRLQ
problem, our goal therefore is to output a good feasible matching assuming that a
feasible matching exists. Computing matchings with minimum number of blocking
pairs (Min-BP) and minimum number of blocking residents (Min-BR) are known to
be NP-Complete. The only approximation algorithms for these problems work under
severe restrictions on the preference lists. We present an algorithm which circumvents
this restriction and computes a popular matching in the HRLQ instance. We show that
on data-sets generated using various generators, our algorithm performs very well in
terms of blocking pairs and blocking residents. Yokoi [20] recently studied envy-free
matchings for the HRLQ problem. We propose a simple modification to Yokoi’s algo-
rithm to output a maximal envy-free matching. We observe that popular matchings
outperform envy-free matchings on several parameters of practical importance, like
size, number of blocking pairs, number of blocking residents.
In the absence of lower quotas, that is, in the Hospital Residents (HR) problem, stable
matchings are guaranteed to exist. Even in this case, we show that popularity is a
practical alternative to stability. For instance, on synthetic data-sets generated using
a particular model, as well as on real world data-sets, a popular matching is on an
average 8-10% larger in size, matches more number of residents to their top-choice,
and more residents prefer the popular matching as compared to a stable matching.
Our comprehensive study reveals the practical appeal of popular matchings for the
HR and HRLQ problems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the
empirical evaluation of popular matchings in this setting.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study two problems – the Hospital Residents (HR) problem and the Hospital
Residents problem with Lower Quotas (HRLQ). The input to the HR problem is a bipartite
graph G = (R∪H, E) where R denotes a set of residents, H denotes a set of hospitals, and
an edge (r, h) ∈ E denotes that r and h are acceptable to each other. Each vertex has a
preference list which is a strict ordering on its neighbors. Further, each hospital has a positive
upper-quota q+(h). In the HRLQ problem, additionally, a hospital has a non-negative lower-
quota q−(h). A matching M is a subset of E such that every resident is assigned at most
one hospital and every hospital is assigned at most upper-quota many residents. Let M(r)
denote the hospital to which resident r is matched in M . Analogously, let M(h) denote the
set of residents that are matched to h in M . A matching M in an HRLQ instance is feasible
if for every hospital h, q−(h) ≤ |M(h)| ≤ q+(h). The goal is to compute a feasible matching
that is optimal with respect to the preferences of the residents and the hospitals. When both
sides of the bipartition express preferences, stability is a well-accepted notion of optimality.
A stable matching is defined by the absence of a blocking pair.
Definition 1. A pair (r, h) ∈ E \M blocks M if either r is unmatched in M or r prefers h
over M(r) and either |M(h)| < q+(h) or h prefers r over some r′ ∈ M(h). A matching M
is stable if there does not exist any blocking pair w.r.t. M , else M is unstable.
⋆ Part of this work was done when the author was an M.Tech. student at IIT Madras.
⋆⋆ Part of this work was done when the author was an MS student at IIT Madras.
From the seminal result of Gale and Shapley [12], it is known that every instance of the
HR problem admits a stable matching and such a matching can be computed in linear time
in the size of the instance. In contrast, there exist simple instances of the HRLQ problem
which do not admit any matching that is both feasible and stable.
r1 : h1 h2
r2 : h1 h2
r3 : h1
[0, 2] h1 : r1 r2 r3
[1, 1] h2 : r2 r1
Fig. 1. A hospital residents instance G with R = {r1, r2, r3} and H = {h1, h2}. The quotas of
the hospitals are q−(h1) = 0, q
+(h1) = 2, q
−(h2) = q
+(h2) = 1. The preferences can be read from
the tables as follows: r1 prefers h1 over h2 and so on. The three matchings M1, M2 and M3 are
shown below. M2 and M3 are feasible but unstable since (r2, h1) blocks M2 and (r1, h1) blocks M3.
M1 = {(r1, h1), (r2, h1)} M2 = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2), (r3, h1)} M3 = {(r1, h2), (r2, h1), (r3, h1)}.
Figure 1 shows an HRLQ instance where h2 has a lower-quota of 1. The instance admits
a unique stable matching M1 which is not feasible. The instance admits two maximum
cardinality matchings M2 and M3, both of which are feasible but unstable. This raises the
question what is an optimal feasible matching in the HRLQ setting?
Our goal in this paper is to propose popularity as a viable option in the HRLQ setting,
and compare and contrast it by an extensive experimental evaluation with other approaches
proposed for this problem. Before giving a formal definition of popularity, we describe some
approaches from the literature to the HRLQ problem.
Hamada et al. [14] proposed the optimality notions (i) minimum number of blocking pairs
(Min-BP) or (ii) minimum number of residents that participate in any blocking pair (Min-BR).
Unfortunately, computing a matching which is optimal according to any of the two notions
is NP-Hard as proved by Hamada et al. [14]. On the positive side, they give approximation
algorithms for a special case of HRLQ, complemented by matching inapproximability results.
Their approximation algorithms require that all the hospitals with non-zero lower-quota
have complete preference lists (CL-restriction).
There are two recent works [18,20] which circumvent the CL-restriction and work with
the natural assumption that the HRLQ instance admits some feasible matching. Nasre and
Nimbhorkar [18] consider the notion of popularity and show how to compute a feasible
matching which is a maximum cardinality popular matching in the set of feasible match-
ings. Yokoi [20] considers the notion of envy-freeness in the HRLQ setting. We define both
popularity and envy-freeness below.
Popular matchings: Popular matchings are defined based on comparison of two matchings
with respect to votes of the participants. To define popular matchings, first we describe how
residents and hospitals vote between two matchings M and M ′. We use the definition from
[18]. For a resident r unmatched in M , we set M(r) = ⊥ and assume that r prefers to be
matched to any hospital in his preference list (set of acceptable hospitals) over ⊥. Similarly,
for a hospital h with capacity q+(h), we set the positions q+(h)− |M(h)| in M(h) to ⊥, so
that |M(h)| is always equal to q+(h). For a vertex u ∈ R ∪ H, voteu(x, y) = 1 if u prefers
x over y, voteu(x, y) = −1 if u prefers y over x and voteu(x, y) = 0 if x = y. Thus, for a
resident r, voter(M,M
′) = voter(M(r),M
′(r)).
Voting for a hospital:A hospital h is assigned q+(h)-many votes to compare two matchings
M andM ′; this can be viewed as one vote per position of the hospital. A hospital is indifferent
between M and M ′ as far as its |M(h)∩M ′(h)| positions are concerned. For the remaining
positions of hospital h, the hospital defines a function corrh. This function allows h to
decide any pairing of residents in M(h) \M ′(h) to residents in M ′(h) \M(h). Under this
pairing, for a resident r ∈ M(h) \M ′(h), corrh(r,M,M
′) is the resident in M ′(h) \M(h)
corresponding to r. Then voteh(M,M
′) =
∑
r∈M(h)\M ′(h) voteh(r, corrh(r,M,M
′)). As an
example, consider q+(h) = 3 and M(h) = {r1, r2, r3} and M
′(h) = {r3, r4, r5}. To decide its
votes, h compares between {r1, r2} and {r4, r5} and one possible corrh is to pair r1 with r4
and r2 with r5. Another corrh function is to pair r1 with r5 and r2 with r4. The choice of
the pairing of residents using corrh is determined by the hospital h. With the voting scheme
as above, popularity can be defined as follows:
Definition 2. A matchingM is more popular thanM ′ if
∑
u∈R∪H voteu(M,M
′) >
∑
u∈R∪H voteu(M
′,M).
A matching M is popular if there is no matching M ′ more popular than M .
It is interesting to note that the algorithms for computing popular matchings do not need
the corr function as an input. The matching produced by the algorithms presented in this
paper is popular for any corr function that is chosen.
Definition 3. Given a feasible matching M in an HRLQ instance, a resident r has justified
envy towards r′ with M(r′) = h if h prefers r over r′ and r is either unmatched or prefers h
over M(r). A matching is envy-free if there is no resident that has a justified envy towards
another resident.
Thus envy-freeness is a relaxation of stability. A matching that is popular amongst feasible
matchings always exists [18], but there exist simple instances of the HRLQ problem that
admit a feasible matching but do not admit a feasible envy-free matching. Yokoi [20] gave
a characterization of HRLQ instances that admit an envy-free matching and an efficient
algorithm to compute some envy-free matching.
An envy-free matching need not even be maximal. In the example in Figure 1 the match-
ing M = {(r2, h2)} is envy-free. Note that M is not maximal, and not even a maximal
envy-free matching. The matchingM ′ = {(r1, h1), (r2, h2)} is a maximal envy-free matching,
since addition of any edge to M ′ violates the envy-free property. The matchings M2 and M3
shown in Figure 1 are not envy-free, since r2 has justified envy towards r3 in M2 whereas r1
has a justified envy towards r3 in M3. The algorithm in [20] outputs the matchingM which
need not even be maximal; Algorithm 2 in Section 2.2 outputs M ′ which is guaranteed to be
maximal envy-free. Finally, the Algorithm 1 in Section 2.1 outputs M2 (see Figure 1) which
is both maximum cardinality as well as popular.
Popularity is an interesting alternative to stability even in the absence of lower-quotas,
that is, in the HR problem. The HR problem is motivated by large scale real-world applica-
tions like the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) in US [3] and the Scottish
Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) in Europe [4]. In applications like NRMP and SFAS it
is desirable from the social perspective to match as many residents as possible so as to reduce
the number of unemployed residents and to provide better staffing to hospitals. Biro` et al. [7]
report that for the SFAS data-set (2006–2007) the administrators were interested in knowing
if relaxing stability would lead to gains in the size of the matching output. It is known that
the size of a stable matching could be half that of the maximum cardinality matching M∗,
whereas the size of a maximum cardinality popular matching is at least 23 |M
∗| (see e.g. [16]).
Thus, theoretically, popular matchings give an attractive alternative to stable matchings.
Popular matchings have gained lot of attention and there have been several interesting
results in the recent past [6,8,10,9,16,18,19]. The algorithms used and developed in this
paper, are inspired by a series of papers [9,11,16,18,19]. One of the goals in this paper is
to complement these theoretical results with an extensive experimental evaluation of the
quality of popular matchings. We now summarize our contributions below:
1.1 Our contribution
Results for HRLQ: Algorithm for popular matchings: We propose a variant of the
algorithm in [18]. Whenever the input HRLQ instance admits a feasible matching, our algo-
rithm outputs a (feasible) popular matching amongst all feasible matchings. We report the
following experimental findings:
– Min-BP and Min-BR objectives: In all the data-sets, the matching output by our algo-
rithm is at most 3 times the optimal for the Min-BP problem and very close to optimal
for the Min-BR problem. In the HRLQ setting, no previous approximation algorithm is
known for incomplete preference lists. The only known algorithms which output match-
ings with theoretical guarantees for the Min-BP and Min-BR problems work under the
CL-restricted model [14]. We remark that the algorithm of [18] can not provide any
bounded approximation ratio for Min-BP and Min-BR problems as it may output a fea-
sible matching with non-zero blocking pairs and non-zero blocking residents even when
the instance admits a stable feasible matching.
– Comparison with envy-free matchings: Based on the algorithm by Yokoi [20], we give
an algorithm to compute a maximal envy-free matching, if it exists, and compare its
quality with a popular matching. Besides the fact that popular matchings exist whenever
feasible matchings exist, which is not the case with envy-free matchings, our experiments
illustrate that, compared to an envy-free matching, a popular matching is about 32%–
43% larger, matches about 15%–38% more residents to their top choice and has an order
of magnitude fewer blocking pairs and blocking residents.
Empirical Evaluation of known algorithms for HR : For the HR problem, we implement
and extensively evaluate known algorithms for maximum cardinality popular matching and
popular amongst maximum cardinality matching on synthetic data-sets as well as limited
number of real-world data-sets.
– Our experiments show that a maximum cardinality popular matching, as well as popular
amongst maximum cardinality matchings are 8–10% larger in size than a stable matching.
We also observe that a maximum cardinality popular matching almost always fares better
than a stable matching with respect to the number of residents matched to their rank-1
hospitals, and the number of residents favoring a maximum cardinality popular matching
over a stable matching.
We note that these properties cannot be proven theoretically as there are instances where
they do not hold. Despite these counter-examples (see Appendix 5) our empirical results
show that the desirable properties hold on synthetic as well as real-world instances. Hence
we believe that popular matchings are a very good practical alternative.
Organization of the paper: In Section 2.1, we present our algorithm to compute a match-
ing that is popular amongst feasible matchings for the HRLQ problem. Our algorithm for
computing a maximal envy-free matching is described in Section 2.2. In Section 3 we give
details of our experimental setup and the data-generation models developed by us. Section 4
gives our empirical results for the HRLQ and HR problems. We refer the reader to [9,19] for
known algorithms for computing popular matchings in the HR problem.
2 Algorithms for HRLQ problem
In Section 2.1, we present our algorithm to compute a popular matching in the HRLQ
problem. As mentioned earlier, our algorithm is a variant of the algorithms in [18]. The
algorithm to find a maximal envy-free matching is given in Section 2.2, and its output is a
superset of the envy-free matching computed by Yokoi’s algorithm [20].
2.1 Algorithm for Popular matching in HRLQ
In this section, we present an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that outputs a feasible matching M
in a given HRLQ instance G, such that M is popular amongst all the feasible matchings
in G. We assume that G admits a feasible matching, which can be checked in polynomial
time [14].
Algorithm 1 is a modification of the standard hospital-proposing Gale and Shapley algo-
rithm [12] and can be viewed as a two-phase algorithm. The first phase simply computes a
stable matchingMs in the input instance ignoring lower quotas. IfMs satisfies the lower quo-
tas of all the hospitals, it just outputs Ms. Otherwise hospitals that are deficient in Ms pro-
pose with increased priority. A hospital h is deficient w.r.t. a matchingM if |M(h)| < q−(h).
We implement the increased priority by assigning a level to each hospital, so that higher level
corresponds to higher priority. A resident always prefers a higher level hospital in its prefer-
ence list to a lower level hospital, irrespective of their relative positions in its preference list.
We show that at most |R| levels suffice to output a feasible matching in the instance, if one
exists. We give a detailed description below.
Algorithm 1 Popular matching in HRLQ
1: Input : G = (R∪H, E)
2: set M = ∅; Q = ∅;
3: for each h ∈ H do set level(h) = 0; add h to Q;
4: for each r ∈ R do set level(r) = -1;
5: while Q is not empty do
6: let h = head(Q);
7: let Sh = residents to whom h has not yet proposed with level(h);
8: if Sh 6= ∅ then
9: let r be the most preferred resident in Sh
10: if r is matched in M (to say h′) then
11: if pref(r, h, h′) == 0 then
12: add h to Q; goto Step 5;
13: else
14: M =M \ {(r, h′)};
15: add h′ to Q if h′ is not present in Q;
16: M =M ∪ {(r, h)}; level(r) = level(h);
17: if level(h) == 0 and |M(h)| < q+(h) then
18: add h to Q;
19: else if h ∈ Hlq and |M(h)| < q
−(h) then
20: add h to Q;
21: else if h ∈ Hlq and level(h) ¡ |R| then
22: level(h) = level(h)+1; add h to Q;
23: // h starts proposing from the beginning of the preference list.
Let G = (R∪H, E) be the given HRLQ instance. Let Hlq denote the set of hospitals which
have non-zero lower quota – we call h ∈ Hlq a lower-quota hospital; we call h /∈ Hlq a
non-lower quota hospital.
Algorithm 1 begins by initializing the matching M and a queue Q of hospitals to be
empty (Step 2). As described above, level of a hospital denotes its current priority, and
initially all the hospitals have level 0. All hospitals are added to Q (Step 3). We also assign
a level to each resident r, which stores the level of the hospital M(r) at the time when r
gets matched to M(r). Initially, all residents are assigned level −1 (Step 4). The main while
loop of the algorithm (Step 5) executes as long as Q is non-empty. Steps 6–16 are similar
to the execution of the hospital-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm [13]. When a matched
resident r gets a proposal from a hospital h, r compares its current match h′ with h using
pref(r, h, h′). We define pref (r, h, h′) = 1 if (i) level(r) < level(h), which means h proposes
to r with a higher priority than h′ did, or (ii) level(r) = level(h) and h has a higher position
than h′ in the preference list of r. We define pref (r, h, h′) = 0 otherwise. Thus matched
resident r accepts the proposal of h and rejects h′ if and only if pref (r, h, h′) = 1. In case
the edge (r, h) is added to M (Step 16), the algorithm also sets the level of r equal to the
level(h).
When a hospital h finishes proposing all the residents on its preference list with level(h) =
i and still |M(h)| < q−(h), level(h) is incremented by 1 and h is added back to Q. This is
done in Step 21. Now h restarts proposing all the residents in its preference list with the
new value of level(h).
Running time and correctness: To see that the algorithm terminates we observe that
every non-lower quota hospital proposes to residents in its preference list at most once. Every
lower-quota hospital proposes to residents on its preference list at most |R| times. Thus the
running time of our algorithm is O((|R| + |H| + |E|) · |R|). To see the correctness note
that when G admits a feasible stable matching our algorithm degenerates to the standard
Gale-Shapley hospital proposing algorithm. As proved in [19], a stable matching is popular
amongst the set of feasible matchings. In case G admits a feasible matching but no feasible
stable matching, techniques as in [18] can be employed to show that the output is popular
amongst the set of feasible matchings.
Theorem 1. In an HRLQ instance G, Algorithm 1 outputs a matching that is feasible and
popular amongst the set of feasible matchings. If G admits a feasible and stable matching,
then Algorithm 1 outputs a stable matching.
2.2 Algorithm for Maximal Envy-free Matching
Yokoi [20] has given an algorithm to compute an envy-free matching in an HRLQ instance
G = (R∪H, E). Yokoi’s algorithm works in the following steps:
1. Set the upper quota of each hospital to its lower quota.
2. Set the lower quota of each hospital to 0, call this modified instance G1.
3. Find a stable matching M1 in the modified instance.
4. Return M1, if every hospital gets matched to as many residents as its upper quota in
G1, otherwise declare that there is no envy-free matching in G.
It can be seen that Yokoi’s algorithm, as stated above, does not return a maximal envy-
free matching. In particular, any hospital with lower-quota 0 does not get matched to any
resident in Yokoi’s algorithm. Hence we propose a simple extension of Yokoi’s algorithm
to compute a maximal envy-free matching, which contains the matching output by Yokoi’s
algorithm. We call a matchingM in G maximal envy-free if, for any edge e = (r, h) ∈ E \M ,
M ∪ {e} is not envy-free. The following definition with respect to Yokoi’s output matching
M1 is useful for our algorithm. Our algorithm is described as Algorithm 2.
Definition 4. Let h be a hospital that is under-subscribed in G with respect to M1, that is
|M1(h)| < q
+(h). A threshold resident rh for h, if one exists, is the most preferred resident
in the preference list of h such that (i) rh is matched in M1, to say h
′, and (ii) rh prefers h
over h′. If no such resident exists, we assume a unique dummy resident rh at the end of h’s
preference list to be the threshold resident for h.
Algorithm 2 Maximal envy-free matching in HRLQ
1: Input : G = (R∪H, E)
2: Compute a matching M1 by Yokoi’s algorithm.
3: if Yokoi’s algorithm declares “no envy-free matching” then
4: Return M = ∅.
5: Let R′ be the set of residents unmatched in M1.
6: Let H′ be the set of hospitals such that |M1(h)| < q
+(h) in G.
7: Let G′ = (R′ ∪ H′, E′) be an induced subgraph of G, where E′ = {(r, h) | r ∈ R′, h ∈
H′, h prefers r over its threshold resident rh}. Set q
+(h) in G′ as q+(h)− q−(h) in G.
8: Each h has the same relative ordering on its neighbors in G′ as in G.
9: M2 = stable matching in G
′ = (R′ ∪ H′, E′).
10: Return M =M1 ∪M2.
Below we prove that the output of Algorithm 2 is a maximal envy-free matching.
Theorem 2. If G admits an envy-free matching, then Algorithm 2 outputs M which is
maximal envy-free in G.
Proof. Since G admits an envy-free matching,M1 output by Yokoi’s algorithm is non-empty.
We prove that M is an envy-free feasible matching, and for each edge e ∈ E \M , M ∪ {e}
is not an envy-free matching.
M is envy-free: Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that a resident r′ has a justified
envy towards a resident r with respect to M . Thus r′ prefers h = M(r) over h′ = M(r′),
and h prefers r′ over r. The edge (r, h) ∈ M and hence either (r, h) ∈ M1 or (r, h) ∈ M2.
Suppose (r, h) ∈M1. Recall that M1 is stable in the instance G1 used in Yokoi’s algorithm.
In this case, the edge (r′, h) blocks M1 in G1 a contradiction to the stability of M1 in G1.
Thus, if possible, let (r, h) ∈ M2, and hence (r, h) ∈ E
′. If r′ is unmatched in M1, then
(r′, h) ∈ E′ and (r′, h) blocks M2 in G
′, contradicting the stability of M2 in G
′. If r′ is
matched in M1 then r
′ /∈ R′ and hence (r′, h) /∈ E′. In this case, the threshold resident rh
of h is either same as r′ or is a resident whom h prefers over r′. Since h prefers r′ over r, h
prefers rh over r. Therefore (r, h) can not be in E
′ by construction, and hence (r, h) /∈ M2.
This proves that M is envy-free.
M is maximal envy-free: We now prove that, for any e = (r, h) /∈ M , M ∪ {e} is not
envy-free. Let e = (r, h), h ∈ H, r ∈ R. Clearly, h must be under-subscribed in M i.e.
|M(h)| < q+(h), and r must be unmatched in M , otherwiseM ∪{e} is not a valid matching
in G. Let rh be the threshold resident of h with respect to M1. Since r is unmatched in M
and hence in M1, r ∈ R
′. (i) If h prefers r over rh, then (r, h) ∈ E
′ blocks M2 in G
′, which
contradicts the stability of M2 in G
′. (ii) If h prefers rh over r, then adding the edge (r, h)
to M makes rh have a justified envy towards r. Thus, M ∪ {(r, h)} is not envy-free.
3 Experimental Setup
The experiments were performed on a machine with a single Intel Core i7-4770 CPU running
at 3.40GHz, with 32GB of DDR3 RAM at 1600MHz. The OS was Linux (Kubuntu 16.04.2,
64 bit) running kernel 4.4.0-59. The code [5] is developed in C++ and was compiled using
the clang-3.8 compiler with -O3 optimization level. To evaluate the performance of our
algorithms, we developed data generators which model preferences of the participants in
real-world instances. We use a limited number of publicly available data-sets as well as real-
world data-sets from elective allocation at IIT-Madras. All the data-sets generated and used
by us are available at [1].
3.1 Data generation models and available data-sets
There are a variety of parameters and all of them could be varied to generate synthetic
data-sets. We focus on four prominent parameters – (i) the number of residents |R|, (ii)
the number of hospitals |H|, (iii) the length of the preference list of each resident k, (iv)
capacity of every hospital cap (by default cap = |R|/|H|). In the synthetic data-sets, all
hospitals have uniform capacity and all residents have the same length of preference list. We
use the following three models of data generation, and data-sets publicly available from [2].
1. Master: Here, we model the real-world scenario that there are some hospitals which
are in high demand among residents and hence have a larger chance of appearing in the
preference list of a resident. Hospitals on the other hand, rely on some global criteria to
rank residents. We set up a geometric probability distribution with p = 0.10 over the
hospitals which denotes the probability with which a hospital is chosen for being included
in the preference list of a resident. Each resident samples k hospitals according to the
distribution and orders them arbitrarily. We also assume that there exists a master list
over the set of residents. For all the neighbours of a hospital, the hospital ranks them
according to the master list of residents.
2. Shuffle: This model is similar to the first model except that we do not assume a master
list on the residents. The residents draw their preference lists as above. Every hospital
orders its neighbours uniformly at random. This models the scenario that hospitals may
have custom defined ranking criteria. Our Shuffle model is closely inspired by the one
described by Mahdian and Immorlica [15].
3. Publicly available HR with couples data-set: Other than generating data-sets
using the three models described above, we used a freely available data-set [2] by
Manlove et al. [17] for the HR problem with couples (HRC problem). The instances
were only modified with respect to the preference list of residents that participate in a
couple, all other aspects of the instance remain the same. Residents participating in a
couple can have different copies of a same hospitals on their preference list which are
not necessarily contiguous. The preference list is created by only keeping the first unique
copy of a hospital in the preference list of a resident.
4. Elective allocation data from IIT-M: We use a limited number of real-world data-
sets available from the IIT Madras elective allocation. The data-sets are obtained from
the SEAT (Student Elective Allocation Tool) which allocates humanities electives and
outside department electives for under-graduate students across the institute every
semester. The input consists of a set of students and a set of courses with capacities
(upper-quotas). Every student submits a preference ordering over a subset of courses
and every course ranks students based on custom ranking criteria. This is exactly the
HR problem.
HRLQ instances: The above three data-generation models (Master, Shuffle, and Random)
are common for generating preferences in HRLQ and HR data-sets. For HRLQ data-sets
we additionally need lower quotas. In all our data-sets, around 90% of the hospitals had
lower quota at least 1. This is to ensure that the instances are HRLQ instances rather
than nearly HR instances. Also, the sum of the lower quota of all the hospitals was kept
around 50% of the total number of positions available. This ensures that at least half of the
residents must be matched to a lower quota hospital. Lastly, we consider only those HRLQ
instances which admit a feasible matching but no stable feasible matching. This is done by
simply discarding instances that admit a feasible stable matching. We discard such instances
because if an instance with feasible stable matching, the stable matching is optimal with
respect to popularity, envy-freeness and min-BP and min-BR objectives.
Methodology: For reporting our results, we fix a model of generation and the parameters
|R|, |H|, k, cap. For the chosen model and the parameters, we generate 10 data-sets and
report arithmetic average for all output parameters on these data-sets.
4 Empirical Evaluation
Here, we present our empirical observations on HRLQ and HR instances. In each case, we
define set of parameters on the basis of which we evaluate the quality of our matchings.
4.1 HRLQ instances
In this section we show the performance of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 on data-sets
generated using models described earlier. Let G be an instance of the HRLQ problem, and
Ms be the stable matching in the instance ignoring lower-quotas. For all our instances Ms
is infeasible. Let Mp denote a popular matching output Algorithm 1 in G. Let Me denote
a maximal envy-free matching output by Algorithm 2. Both Mp and Me are feasible for G
and hence unstable.
Parameters of interest:We now define the parameters of the matching that are of interest
in the HRLQ problem. For M ∈ {Mp,Me} we compute the following.
– S(M) : size of the matching M in G.
– BPC(M) : number of blocking pairs w.r.t. M in G. Since M is not stable in G, this
parameter is expected to be positive; however we would like this parameter to be small.
– BR(M) : number of residents that participate in at least one blocking pair w.r.t. M .
– R1(M) : number of residents matched to their rank-1 hospitals in M .
We additionally compute the deficiency of the stable matching Ms. Hamada et al. [14]
showed that Def(Ms, G) is a lower bound on the number of blocking pairs and the number
of blocking residents in an HRLQ instance. To analyze the goodness of Mp and Me w.r.t.
the Min-BP and Min-BR objectives, we compare the number of blocking pairs and blocking
residents with the lower bound of Def(Ms, G).
– Def(Ms, G) : This parameter denotes the deficiency of the stable (but not feasible)
matchingMs in G. For every hospital h, let def(Ms, h) = max{0, q
−(h)−|Ms(h)|}. The
deficiency of the instance G is the sum of the deficiencies of all hospitals.
We now describe our observations for the data-sets generated using various models. For a
particular model, we vary the parameters |R|, |H|, k, cap to generate HRLQ data-sets using
the different models. In all our tables a column with the legend ↑ implies that larger values
are better. Analogously, a column with the legend ↓ implies smaller values are better.
|H| Def(Ms, G) S(M) ↑ BPC(M) ↓ BR(M) ↓ R1(M) ↑
Mp Me Mp Me Mp Me Mp Me
100 30.80 885.40 559.00 78.50 2747.00 34.80 822.00 554.10 174.00
20 23.60 897.90 510.66 67.70 3067.33 27.50 803.66 570.40 195.33
10 27.50 912.80 535.50 85.10 2945.00 31.10 770.87 600.40 226.87
Table 1. Data generated using the Master model. All values are absolute. |R| = 1000, k = 5.
Popular Matchings versus Maximal Envy-free Matchings Here we report the quality
of popular matchings and envy-free matchings on the parameters of interest listed above on
different models.
Table 1 shows the results for popular matchings (Mp) and maximal envy-free matchings
(Me) on data-sets generated using the Master model.
Table 2 shows the results for popular matchings (Mp) and maximal envy-free matchings
(Me) on data-sets generated using the Shuffle model.
|H| Def(Ms, G) S(M) ↑ BPC(M) ↓ BR(M) ↓ R1(M) ↑
Mp Me Mp Me Mp Me Mp Me
100 17.00 892.70 – 27.20 – 19.40 – 350.30 –
20 20.60 915.30 547.00 34.40 2838.20 23.60 808.00 343.90 185.80
10 35.40 930.00 490.33 57.80 3388.00 35.40 853.00 309.30 147.00
Table 2. Data generated using the Shuffle model. All values are absolute.|R| = 1000, k = 5.
We observe the following from the above two tables.
– Guaranteed existence: As noted earlier, envy-free matchings are not guaranteed to
exist in contrast to popular matchings which always exist in HRLQ instances. For in-
stance, in the Shuffle model, for |R| = 1000, |H| = 100, k = 5 (Table 2, Row 1) none
of the instances admit an envy-free matching. Thus, for the columns Me we take an
average over the instances that admit an envy-free matching.
– Size: It is evident from the tables that in terms of size popular matchings are about
32%–43% larger as compared to envy-free matchings (when they exist). See Column
S(M) in Table 1 and Table 2.
– BPC and BR: In terms of the blocking pairs and blocking residents, popular matchings
beat envy-free matchings by over an order of magnitude. We remark that to ensure envy-
freeness, several hospitals may to be left under-subscribed. This explains the unusually
large blocking pairs and blocking residents in envy-free matchings. Furthermore, note
that Def(Ms, G) is a lower-bound on both the number of blocking pairs and blocking
residents. On all instances, for popular matchings the number of blocking pairs (BPC)
is at most 3 times the optimal whereas the number of blocking residents (BR) is close
to the optimal value.
– Number of Envy-pairs: Although we do not report it explicitly, the number of envy
pairs in an envy-free matching is trivially zero and for any matching it is upper bounded
by the number of blocking pairs. Since the number of blocking pairs is significantly small
for popular matchings, we conclude that the number of envy-pairs is also small.
– Number of residents matched to rank-1 hospitals: For any matching, a desirable
criteria is to match as many participants to their top-choice. Again on this count, we
see that popular matchings match about 15%–38% more residents to their top choice
hospital (See Column R1(M) in the above tables).
4.2 Results on HR instances
To analyze the quality of popular matchings on various data-sets, we generate an HR instance
G = (H ∪ R, E), compute a resident optimal stable matching Ms, a maximum cardinality
popular matching Mp and a popular matching among maximum cardinality matchings Mm.
The matchings Mp and Mm are generated by creating reduced instances G2 and G|R| re-
spectively, and executing the resident proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm in the respective
instance. Theoretically, we need to construct G|R| for computing Mm, practically we ob-
serve that almost always a constant number suffices say constructing G10 suffices. We now
describe our output parameters.
Parameters of interest: For any matching M , let R1(M) denote the number of residents
matched to rank-1 hospitals in M . For two matchingsM and M ′, let VR(M,M
′) denote the
number of residents that prefer M over M ′. For each instance we compute the following:
– S(Ms) : size of the stable matching Ms in G.
– For M to be one of Mp or Mm define:
• ∆ : |M|−|Ms||Ms| ×100. This denotes the percentage increase in size ofMs when compared
to M . When comparing Ms with either Mp or Mm, ∆ is guaranteed to be non-
negative. The larger this value, the better the matching in terms of size as compared
to Ms.
• ∆1 :
R1(M)−R1(Ms)
R1(Ms)
× 100. This denotes the percentage increase in number of rank-1
residents of Ms when compared to M . As discussed in the Introduction, there is no
guarantee that this value is non-negative. However, we prefer that the value is as
large as possible.
• ∆R :
VR(M,Ms)−VR(Ms,M)
|R| × 100. This denotes the percentage increase in number
of resident votes of M when compared to Ms. Similar to ∆1, there is no apriori
guarantee that more residents preferM overMs. A positive value for this parameter
indicates thatM is more resident popular as compared toMs. That is, in an election
where only residents vote, a majority of the residents would like to move from Ms
to M .
• BP (M) : number of blocking pairs in M|E|−|M| ×100. The minimum value for BP (M) can
be 0 (for a stable matching) and the maximum value can be 100, due to the choice
of the denominator (|E| − |M |). Since matchings Mm and Mp are not stable, this
parameter is expected to be positive and we consider it as the price we pay to get
positive values for ∆, ∆1 and ∆R.
We now present our results on data-sets generated using different models. In each case we
start with a stable marriage instance (with |R| = |H|) and gradually increase the capacity.
As before, a column with the legend ↑ implies that larger values are better for that column.
Analogously, a column with the legend ↓ implies smaller values are better.
|R| = 1000, k = 5 Mp vs Ms Mm vs Ms
|H| S(Ms) ∆ ↑ BP (Mp) ↓ ∆1 ↑ ∆R ↑ ∆ ↑ BP (Mm) ↓ ∆1 ↑ ∆R ↑
1000 757.90 11.81 4.66 -3.49 5.25 12.79 5.34 -4.02 6.41
100 823.50 12.93 8.57 -1.64 7.41 13.99 9.96 -2.80 8.58
20 870.70 11.65 12.22 0.24 7.32 12.25 14.47 -0.36 7.47
10 890.00 10.68 16.32 0.76 2.37 10.80 16.57 0.73 2.64
Table 3. Data generated using the Master model. All values except S(Ms) are percentages.
Master : Table 3 shows our results on data-sets generated using the Master model. Here,
we see that for all data-sets we get at least 10.5% increase in the size when comparing Ms
vs Mp (column 3) and Ms vs Mm (column 7). The negative value of ∆1 (columns 5 and 9)
indicates that we reduce the number of residents matched to their rank-1 hospitals by at
most 4.02% in our experiments and we also marginally gain for smaller values of |H|. The
parameter ∆R is observed to be positive which shows that a majority of residents prefer
Mp over Ms (column 6) and also prefer Mm over Ms (column 10). Finally, the value of BP
(columns 4 and 8) goes on increasing as we reduce the value of |H|.
Shuffle : The results obtained on data-sets generated using the Shuffle model are presented
in Table 4. The size gains are at least 6% when comparing Ms with Mp (column 3) and
Mm (column 7). Looking at the values of ∆1 from column 5 and column 9 we see that the
number of residents matched to their rank-1 hospitals are almost always more, with up to
18% getting their rank-1 choices. We also observe that ∆R is always positive, which implies
that majority of the residents prefer Mp and Mm over Ms.
|R| = 1000, k = 5 Mp vs Ms Mm vs Ms
|H| S(Ms) ∆ ↑ BP (Mp) ↓ ∆1 ↑ ∆R ↑ ∆ ↑ BP (Mm) ↓ ∆1 ↑ ∆R ↑
1000 776.80 9.39 2.33 0.52 4.27 10.20 2.80 -0.14 5.39
100 856.00 8.56 3.55 8.72 7.80 9.23 4.13 9.79 9.38
20 900.80 7.10 5.50 13.87 9.86 7.52 6.01 15.55 11.37
10 935.40 6.03 16.57 17.35 5.77 6.15 16.76 18.02 6.32
Table 4. Data generated using the Shuffle model. All values except S(Ms) are percentages.
Processed HR couples data-set: Table 5 shows our results on publicly available HR with
couples data-set [2]. As seen from the columns with different ∆ values, popular matchings
perform favourably on all desired parameters on these data-sets. This is similar to our
observations on data generated using the Shuffle model. We also investigated the relation
between data generated using Shuffle model and the data used in this experiment and
found that the data-sets are similar in their characteristics. This confirms that Shuffle is a
reasonable model. Our results on these data-sets confirm that popular matchings perform
favourably on variants of the Shuffle model.
|R| = 100, k = 3 . . . 5 Mp vs Ms Mm vs Ms
|H| S(Ms) ∆ ↑ BP (Mp) ↓ ∆1 ↑ ∆R ↑ ∆ ↑ BP (Mm) ↓ ∆1 ↑ ∆R ↑
90 84.67 10.10 6.26 2.79 4.62 11.81 8.55 1.20 7.16
50 87.19 9.61 8.25 4.53 4.99 11.01 10.77 3.12 6.47
20 91.35 7.92 13.57 9.30 4.28 8.41 14.93 8.22 3.86
10 93.53 6.61 19.94 5.34 -1.86 6.73 20.43 4.99 -2.00
Table 5. Processed data-sets from [2]. All values except S(Ms) are percentages.
Real world data-sets from IIT-M: Table 6 shows our results on data-sets obtained from
the IIT-M elective allocation (the three rows in the table correspond to the Aug–Nov 2016,
Jan–May 2017 and Aug–Nov 2017 humanities elective allocation data respectively).
|R|, |H|, m, avg. pref. length Mp vs Ms Mm vs Ms
|R| |H| |E| apl S(Ms) ∆ ↑ BP (Mp) ↓ ∆1 ↑ ∆R ↑ ∆ ↑ BP (Mm) ↓ ∆1 ↑ ∆R ↑
483 18 5313 11.00 481 0.41 1.32 0 -0.20 0.41 1.32 0 -0.20
729 16 4534 6.21 675 8.00 31.98 7.39 -5.48 8.00 31.98 7.39 -5.48
655 14 2689 4.10 487 18.27 16.42 14.97 7.17 23.81 29.91 24.06 5.49
Table 6. Real data-sets from IIT-M elective allocation. All values except S(Ms) are percentages.
For each data-set we list the number of students (|R|), the number of courses (|H|), the
sum of total preferences (m) and the average preference list over the set of students (apl).
On an average, each course has a capacity of 50. For each course a custom ranking criteria
is used to rank students who have expressed preference in the course. As seen in Table 6, for
the Jan–May 2017 (row 2) and Aug–Nov 2017 (row 3) data-sets, popular matchings perform
very favourably as compared to stable matching.
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5 Example Instances
5.1 Instance where a stable matching is favourable over a maximum
cardinality popular matching
r1 : h1
r2 : h2 h4 h3
r3 : h1 h2
r4 : h4
[0, 1] h1 : r3 r1
[0, 1] h2 : r3 r2
[0, 1] h3 : r2
[0, 1] h4 : r4 r2
Fig. 2. Example instance in which stable matching Ms matches more residents to their rank-1
hospitals than the maximum cardinality popular matching Mp.
Here, we present an HR instance G = (R ∪ H, E) (in fact a stable marriage instance)
which shows that (i) the stable matching Ms in G matches more residents to their rank-1
hospitals than the maximum cardinality popular matchingMm in G and (ii) more number of
residents preferMs overMm. This example shows that theoretically there are no guarantees
on these parameters for a popular matching.
Let R = {r1, . . . , r4} and H = {h1, . . . , h4} with the preferences of the residents and
hospitals as given in Figure 2. All hospitals have an upper quota of 1. The instance admits
a unique stable matching Ms = {(r2, h2), (r3, h1), (r4, h4)} whereas the maximum cardinal-
ity popular matching is Mp = {(r1, h1), (r2, h3), (r3, h2), (r4, h4)}. The stable matching Ms
matches three residents to their rank-1 hospitals whereas Mp matches exactly one resident
to its rank-1 hospital. Similarly two residents prefer Ms over Mp and exactly one resident
prefers Mp over Ms.
5.2 Instance where max. cardinality popular matching is favourable over a
stable matching
Consider another instance where R = {r1, . . . , r5} and H = {h1, . . . , h5}. All hospitals
have a lower quota of 0 and upper quota of 1. The preferences of the residents and the
hospitals are as given in 3. The matching Ms = {(r1, h4), (r3, h1), (r4, h5), (r5, h3)} is stable
in the instance whereas the matching Mp = {(r1, h4), (r2, h5), (r3, h1), (r4, h3), (r5, h2)} is a
maximum cardinality popular matching in the instance. The matchingMp has three residents
matched to their rank-1 hospitals as opposed to Ms which has only two residents matched
to their rank-1 hospitals. Furthermore, it is easy to see that more residents prefer Mp over
Ms than the other way.
r1 : h5 h4
r2 : h5 h3
r3 : h1
r4 : h3 h5
r5 : h3 h2 h1
[0,1] h1 : r3 r5
[0,1] h2 : r5
[0,1] h3 : r5 r2 r4
[0,1] h4 : r1
[0,1] h5 : r4 r1 r2
Fig. 3. Example instance in which max. cardinality popular matching Mp matches more residents
to their rank-1 hospitals than the stable matching Ms. More residents prefer Mp over Ms that the
other way.
